The Terrible “Day After” in Gaza (2024)

With the Gaza war now into its seventh month and no clear end in sight, Israeli and global commentators have shown discomfort and discouragement with the conflict’s course and possible outcomes. It seems as if nothing is going according to plan. Phrases like “defeat” and “forever wars” recur. Concern has grown in Israel that the country may be turning into a pariah state. Gazans are faced with unimaginable and unmet humanitarian needs, while talk of reconstruction cannot even begin. The discomfort and discouragement are understandable, but the surprise is much less justified: everything is going according to plan.

And what is that plan? Israel was clear in its strategic goals from the outset: to destroy Hamas’s military and governing capabilities. Those vaguely defined objectives were to be met through a variety of quite openly discussed means that would entail the massive dislocation of Gaza’s population for an undefined period, significant destruction of infrastructure, and elimination of United Nations bodies that had provided education and other social services for many Gazans.

The goal of eliminating Hamas was ambitious, and it was not one to be finally achieved so much as continuously managed: from the beginning Israeli officials were very clear that they anticipated an indefinite Israeli security presence in Gaza. Officials have spoken off the record—and have been echoed by former officials on the record—that they anticipate a situation like “Area B” in the West Bank. They seem to be referring here not to the original Oslo Accords provisions but to current arrangements in which the Israeli security forces have complete freedom of movement and Palestinian Authority civil structures operate to the extent that Israeli security arrangements allow them to do so.

To be fair, for all the horrific consequences of such an approach, there was a strong logic behind it: past attempts to work out a modus vivendi with Hamas had collapsed; a series of unspeakable atrocities had just been committed. Just below the surface was a sense that Israel was already in a “forever war,” whether it liked it or not. Therefore, the plan was how to manage this situation for the foreseeablefuture.

Given the atmosphere in Israel, those who have argued for a different approach find themselves pushing very steeply uphill. Talk of a two-state solution is repugnant for some Israeli leaders and outmoded for others. Even talk of reintroducing the Palestinian Authority (PA) to Gaza is rejected by officials. When working with the PA has been reluctantly accepted by some centrist and even dovish experts as “pragmatic” and “realistic,” it has come only with unworkable conditions attached that make Palestinian leaders essentially subcontractors rather than state builders.

Those complaining that Israel had no “day after” plan for Gaza have presumably read and heard all this. But what was understood last fall and early spring as a lack of Israeli planning for the day after missed the point. This was the plan for the day after. It just did not include any provisions for Gazans. Governance, social services, and public security (as opposed to Israeli security) were not Israel’s problems and would have to be provided by others—subject to Israeli oversight and approval.

More than six months after the onset of war, most of the post-conflict scenarios discussed in the early stages—among them, the deployment of international or regional peacekeeping forces or a transitional government potentially overseen by the United Nations to administer Gaza—have faded away. They are giving way to a sense that the war may be over in the sense of continued major military offences. Recent developments, including the delay or even cancellation of military operations in Rafah; open U.S. pressure; a notable reduction in Israeli combat forces in Gaza; and promises of an increase in humanitarian aid all combine to suggest that Israel might be veering toward less severe operations that would not include displacement of hundreds of thousands of people.

So whether this is the “day after,” whether there will be “no day after,” or whether this is “the new normal,” the situation is clear. Gaza lies in ruins, heavily reliant on humanitarian assistance, with Israel maintaining military control without intentions of withdrawal. Significant areas of Gaza have been transformed into buffer zones, rendering them uninhabitable, effectively turning Gaza into a refugee “super-camp.” Gazans are completely dependent on aid delivered by the United Nations agencies. Hamas’s prewar governance may be effectively destroyed, but the organization seems to maintain a capacity to engage in limited yet disruptive attacks, including eliminating potential competitors for local governance in Gaza.

The joint interim assessment report of the European Union, the World Bank, and the UN is that losses estimated at $18.5 billion have been inflicted on the built-up infrastructure of Gaza, which is equivalent to 97 percent of the total Gross Domestic Product of the West Bank and Gaza in 2022. The majority of Palestinians in Gaza are now “multidimensionally poor” (access to health and education, employment, housing, safety and personal freedom, and monetary poverty). According to the International Labor Organization, 90 percent of pre-conflict jobs have been lost. Clearing unexploded bombs will take years. In the worst-case scenario, where the economy grows by 0.4 percent a year, as has been the case in recent years, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development predicts that it will take Gaza “until 2092, or seven decades, just for it to go back to its economic level of 2022.” And plans to create a framework for reconstruction in Gaza are not even in the works.

While not in the focus, the situation in the West Bank is also dire, with unprecedented levels of land confiscation. The blunt plan of Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich to turn Palestine into Bantustans is unfolding without obstruction, with no Israeli factions currently supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state. Should there be a shift in the U.S. administration, those who may frame policy have already openly abandoned the idea of the State of Palestine and are bluntly advocating for “Guam and Puerto Rico.”

And it is now clear that if a “revitalized Palestinian Authority” is the key to a better future, this is not happening. “Revitalization” seems to mean little more than younger leaders cut from the same cloth as older ones, coupled with policy changes to meet the demands of Israelis who never trusted the Oslo process during the 1990s. And the result is that there is a new government in Ramallah, but its agenda resembles the reform goals which the former Palestinian prime minister Mohammed Shtayyeh announced before being replaced. So far, there is very little evidence of change in the prospect of real Palestinian Authority (PA) governance in Gaza. Hamas-Fatah relations are not getting better and intra-Fatah jockeying for power has not abated. With Israel holding an effective veto over elections in Palestine, it is difficult to envision how the PA will regain democratic legitimacy. Presidential succession remains an issue, and, if anything, the possible resolution through elections in case of a presidential vacancy is now more complicated. Those who talk of “revitalization” have no viable plan to reverse PA decay.

The Israeli military takeover of Gaza and the level of devastation there, coupled with ongoing violence and deepening annexation in the West Bank, make it necessary to repeat that what is looming appears to beless like the day after conflict than a long twilight of disintegration and despair.

* Vladimir Pran has been an adviser on Palestinian electoral and political processes for the National Democratic Institute, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, the European Union, and the United Nations.

The Terrible “Day After” in Gaza (2024)

FAQs

Why did Sharon leave Gaza? ›

The motivation behind the disengagement was described by Sharon's top aide as a means of isolating Gaza and avoiding international pressure on Israel to reach a political settlement with the Palestinians. The disengagement plan was implemented in August 2005 and completed in September 2005.

What's going on in Gaza? ›

Gaza has been under a violent blockade for 16 years.

More than 50% of the population are unemployed. Hospitals have consistently been out of up to 40% of needed supplies and medicine. Approximately 96% of water in Gaza is undrinkable. Electricity is only available sporadically.

Were the greenhouses destroyed in Gush Katif? ›

When the Israelis left Gaza, half of the greenhouses were dismantled by their owners before leaving because they doubted they would receive compensation. Afterwards Palestinians looted the area, and 800 of 4,000 greenhouses were left unusable, while, according to Wolfensohn, most were left intact.

What is the Gaza Strip issue? ›

The Gaza–Israel conflict is a localized part of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict beginning in 1948, when 200,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled from their homes, settling in the Gaza Strip as refugees. Since then, Israel has fought 15 wars against the Gaza Strip.

What was Sharon's plan for Gaza? ›

Israel's plan of unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip and North Samaria put forward by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was carried out on 15 August 2005. The purpose of the plan was to improve Israel's security and international status in the absence of peace negotiations with the Palestinians.

Who owns the Gaza Strip today? ›

Israel completed the disengagement on 12 September 2005. Presently, most of the West Bank is administered by Israel though 42% of it is under varying degrees of autonomous rule by the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority. The Gaza Strip is currently under the control of Hamas.

What is so special about Gaza? ›

Gaza Strip, territory occupying 140 square miles (363 square km) along the Mediterranean Sea just northeast of the Sinai Peninsula. The Gaza Strip is unusual in being a densely settled area not recognized as a de jure part of any extant country.

Is Gaza a part of Palestine? ›

The Gaza Strip and the West Bank are two Palestinian territories that were part of Mandate Palestine and were captured by Israel during the Six-Day War in 1967. There are over 5 million Palestinians combined living in the two territories.

What is Israel doing to Gaza? ›

Aid organisations have long warned that Israel's offensive on Rafah in Gaza's south – which began in early May and has displaced more than 1 million Palestinians – blocked access to the two crossings through which the vast majority of food and other essential supplies had entered Gaza amid Israel's complete blockade of ...

Is the Gaza Strip inhabitable? ›

The Gaza Strip, half of whose population are children, is now rendered almost uninhabitable, with people lacking adequate sources of income and access to water, sanitation, health or education.

Why did Israel close the Karni Crossing? ›

The deadliest suicide attack to come via Karni was the Port of Ashdod bombing in 2004. In 2006, the Israeli authorities closed the crossing for over 100 days due to terror alerts and rocket fire.

What is the water crisis in the Gaza Strip? ›

Years of clashes between Hamas and Israel have severely deteriorated Gaza's water and sanitation services. The 2014 war alone caused $34 million in damage to these systems. During the May 2021 escalation, 290 water infrastructure “objects” were damaged, inflicting $10–15 million in damages.

Why did Israel give up Gaza Strip? ›

After 1993, when Israel and the Palestinians reached a peace accord after the first intifada, Israel pulled out of all populated areas of Gaza, withdrawing only to settlements and military installations. This afforded the Palestinian Authority (PA) room to establish a measure of self-rule.

What is life like in Gaza? ›

There is a total absence of education in Gaza, leaving 625,000 children out of school. Over 1 million children in Gaza are in need of mental health support. 5,500 babies, or 180 per day, are due to be born in the next 30 days. More than 600,000 children are now trapped in Rafah with nowhere else to flee.

How big is Gaza compared to a US state? ›

The Gaza Strip is geographically about the size of Philadelphia, Detroit or the country of Grenada.

Why can't people leave Gaza? ›

Gaza is surrounded by blockades imposed by Israel and Egypt, which restrict movement. Israel prevents access to and from Gaza by sea and air. Land movement is restricted to three crossings: the Egypt-controlled Rafah crossing and Erez and Kerem Shalom crossings, which Israel controls.

How much does it cost to leave Gaza? ›

Prices for such crossings for Palestinians have soared since the war. In January 2022, Human Rights Watch (hrw), an international monitor, put them at around $700 per person. Today they cost at least $5,000 for an adult and $2,500 for a child. Some report paying up to $15,000.

How did Plestia get out of Gaza? ›

On 22 November 2023, roughly one month into the Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip, Alaqad and her family fled to Egypt via the Rafah Border Crossing and then, a few days later, to Australia, having secured visas via her uncle.

Why is Israel blocking Gaza? ›

For months, right-wing Israelis have been protesting and blocking roads to prevent aid shipments from reaching Gaza, which is under a suffocating Israeli blockade. The efforts have further strained the flow of desperately needed aid to the territory.

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